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ABSTRACT: Social movements never entirely win or lose, nor do they suddenly appear or disappear. Just 
as their component parts recombine and continue in other forms, so movements have dozens of impacts of 
various kinds. To make sense of this complexity we propose examining the outcomes of political interactions 
for a variety of players (including individuals) across a range of arenas. Given the acknowledged tradeoffs 
and dilemmas of collective action, we would expect packages of outcomes to appear together sometimes; 
for example, gains in street mobilization may lead to losses in the form of a damaged reputation or police 
repression. The first step to explaining such patterns is to identify and name them. We examine one of 
these outcome patterns, the arena-ownership package, through the case of Seattle’s historic $15 per hour 
wage law passed in 2014, the first ever in a major U.S. city. The players who crafted the bill included an 
avowed Socialist, the owner of Seattle’s iconic Space Needle tower, many representatives of the city’s labor 
movement, and the newly elected Democratic Mayor Ed Murray. These diverse players moved through a 
series of complex arenas to arrive at the legislative outcome. In this case, we find players who create new 
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arenas, rather than only using already-existing arenas. This move is associated with a typical package of 
gains and losses: increased control for the player on the one hand, but corresponding losses and risks—the 
alienation of excluded players and increased perception of responsibility. The creating player is blamed for 
the arena’s failures as well as credited with its successes. 
KEYWORDS: social movement outcomes, players and arenas, success and failure, gains and losses, 
arena creation 




Studies of social movement consequences have long sought answers to broad questions, such as: Which 
strategy leads to success? But recent scholarship suggests that broad predictions about outcomes are limited 
(Amenta 2006; McCammon 2012). Theory and research have identified more and more outcomes that protest 
can generate (Bosi et al. 2016). Social movements rarely win or lose, at least not entirely. Movements have 
dozens of impacts of various kinds. Some of them are gains for players within the movements, advancing their 
implicit or explicit goals, while others are losses for many of those same players. The same movement actor 
may experience both gains and losses at the same time or in quick succession—imprisonment followed by 
celebrity, for example. A social movement organization may lose a policy fight but gain new members.  
All social movement actors experience tradeoffs when making decisions about which actions to take. When 
they grapple with the decision in advance of making it, they experience the tradeoff as a conscious dilemma. 
Given that social movement actors, as well as those players they target, face recurring dilemmas across time 
and space (whether or not to use disruptive tactics, for example) we expect certain packages of outcomes—
that is, of gains and losses—to appear together regularly (Jasper et al. 2022). 
This article highlights one common but understudied move available to some players, and the gains and 
losses entailed with making it (or choosing not to): players frequently create new arenas, rather than simply 
using those that already exist. This move is associated with a typical package of gains and losses: the capacity 
to write the rules and define the boundaries of the new arena on the one hand, but corresponding costs and 
risks on the other—the alienation of excluded players, as well as increased perception of responsibility. 
‘Owning’ an arena means that a player is blamed for its failures as well as credited with its successes—gains 
and losses accrue accordingly. Although activists sometimes create arenas, it is more often players with greater 
resources and institutional positions who create them. A players-and-arenas framework allows us to follow 
calls ‘to put social movements in their place’ (McAdam and Boudet 2012) by tracing the interactions among 
players that lead to political outcomes; movements are just one set of players among many others (Amenta 
2014). 
We analyze the contestation over Seattle’s $15 per hour wage law, passed in 2014, the first ever in a major 
U.S. city, because it illustrates the importance of arena creation and the packages of gains and losses that come 
with it. A diverse group of players (including, for example, both an avowed socialist and the owner of Seattle’s 
iconic Space Needle tower) moved through a series of complex arenas to arrive at the legislative outcome. We 
find no fewer than six instances of arena creation and hence argue that this phenomenon is likely more central 
to the story of social movement “victories” and “defeats” than has previously been recognized. 
 
2. Collective Action as Strategic Interaction and the Importance of Arena 
Creation 
 
This article relies on a “players and arenas” conceptual framework (Jasper 2006, Jasper and Duyvendak 








both movement players and their targets (Jasper and King 2020). This theory is compatible with a process-
tracing method of research (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bosi 2016b). 
Players are the individuals and organizations engaged in strategic interaction. Simple players are individuals 
and compound players are two or more individuals who coordinate as a unified player. Compound players 
range from semi-formal alliances or factions to formal organizations with constitutions, bylaws, and budgets.  
 Arenas are the concrete places where players interact – whether cooperatively or conflictually – to 
make decisions and to fight. Like players, arenas range from the informal to the highly formal, and in fact all 
compound players are also arenas, in which individuals and factions jockey for decision-making power even 
when the outside world sees a unified player. On the informal end of the spectrum, a street corner constitutes 
an arena if protestors and police engage there. Laws and other rules, in part, define the arena, but players may 
choose to break those laws. The history of police-protest engagement in that neighborhood, that city, that 
country, as it lives in the minds of those interacting, also helps to constitute that arena and what is normal to 
do within it. But again, either side may break the norms. Arenas have rules and norms, but those rules and 
norms never fully determine the actions of players within them. 
 At the other end of the spectrum we find formal arenas like courts. There, the consequences for 
violating laws, norms, and rules are usually more explicit and predictable than on the street corner. Yet even 
here, a new prosecutor may have no history at all with the judge, on the one hand, or his father may have gone 
to law school with her, on the other. The rules and norms even of rigid arenas shift in subtle and occasionally 
drastic ways depending on the players who enter them.  
 
2.1 Packages of Gains and Losses 
 
Two traditions used to dominate the study of movement impacts. One analyzed the strategies that help 
movements succeed or fail (Gamson 1975; Piven and Cloward 1977), while the other focused on pre-existing 
conditions that lead to various outcomes, including success (Giugni et al. 1999; Goodwin 2001). Today, 
scholars are more likely to tie institutional structures, player strategies, and outcomes together (Amenta 2006, 
Amenta and Short 2020; Andrews 2004), especially by examining the interactions among various players 
(Andrews and Gaby 2020; Bosi 2016b). This approach often entails looking at subplayers within a movement. 
We build on this work with a language of players, arenas, and strategic interaction to identify patterns of gains 
and losses made by the various players engaged in strategic interaction.  
The story is necessarily complex, filled with more small gains and losses than large ones. Scholars for 
example study the effect and enforcement of laws (Jabola-Carolus 2017) and find that the strategic drama 
continues after legislators make laws. No sooner did Franklin Delano Roosevelt sign the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935, than powerful business interests set about to unwind it. Twelve years later they did, 
passing the Taft-Hartley Act, formally reversing some of the most important gains of the earlier Act. Even 
what appear to be full legislative successes are contingent upon ongoing strategic interaction for their 
implementation. 
Often gains and losses are inseparable, another way in which a strategic interaction perspective demands a 
subtler accounting of movement outcomes. We observe recurring packages of gains and losses produced by 
how players resolve strategic dilemmas that they consciously face, or in how they muddle through the tradeoffs 








In a recent study, for example, we identified a package of gains and losses associated with the 
institutionalization of activist demands for participatory budgeting in New York City (Jabola-Carolus et al. 
2018). In this case movement players faced the powerful allies dilemma, ultimately choosing to make friends 
with key politicians who helped to advance their agenda. They successfully compelled these allies to adopt the 
practice and formalize it across an array of city arenas--thus achieving their stated goals. Yet this success and 
stability was linked with decreased control and capacity for the activists who had sought formal 
institutionalization; city bureaucrats and elected officials shaped participatory budgeting to meet their own 
ends, rather than those of movement players. Movement players then faced the ‘being there’ dilemma (Jasper 
2006:115): should they continue to expend organizational resources to participate in the institution they 
created, or should they call their efforts a success and move on to other arenas, with the erosion of gains that 
this decision typically entails?   
In short, players face conscious dilemmas and unacknowledged tradeoffs. Choosing one horn of a dilemma 
produces a typical package of gains and losses. Choosing the other horn produces one as well, usually an 
inverse of the other package. Even where scholars have not identified recurring packages, we should look for 
bundles of gains and losses that, with more study, we may recognize as common packages. Even where there 
is no clear pattern, we expect gains and losses to come hand in hand.  
Success and failure are never fully distinct. Sometimes the shock of a crushing defeat galvanizes players to 
convert bystanders into players, and the movement returns stronger than before the defeat. Sometimes a new 
piece of legislation goes unenforced, and what seems like an unequivocal victory proves to be only a 
momentary gain.  
By examining strategic choices and the packages of gains and losses associated with them, we contribute 
to a theoretical language that acknowledges both the agency of social actors and the complexity of social 
movement outcomes. The “arena-ownership” package is an example, which stems from the strategic choice to 
create new arenas. 
 
2.2 Arena creation in strategic interaction 
In the players and arenas approach, the arena contains many elements of what would be called structure in 
other paradigms. In the strategic interaction perspective, players can often select the arenas they enter, and 
players can operate in multiple arenas simultaneously or sequentially. Arenas demystify social structure and 
put structuring forces in the most concrete possible terms (Jasper 2021), much in the spirit of actor-network 
and related theories (Latour 2005). 
 But even in the players and arenas perspective, arenas are typically a given. Players may reshape them, 
change their rules, or violate their norms. But the courts are the courts, and the streets are the streets. The core 
contribution of this paper is to focus on an underappreciated phenomenon: players, movement players and 
elites alike, often create arenas, from scratch. Players have the ability to pivot from one arena to the other, and 
to reshape the arenas which they enter. But they also have the ability to pause, confer among themselves, and 
construct new arenas. They may lure targets into the arena, or they may use the arena to recruit to their alliance. 
There are countless reasons why a player might create an arena. 
In the case that follows, we will see that arena creation was both common and consequential in the strategic 
interactions that produced a historic policy change. We identify six instances of arena creation: the Seattle 
Mayor created a decision-making arena, only to discover that the arena was so unwieldy it threatened collapse; 








movement player constructed an arena in which members of the public came to feel decision-making 
ownership over the $15 an hour movement; business players created an arena in which to determine their 
collective interests in negotiations with the Mayor and organized labor; organized labor created their own 
coalition arena in which to determine theirs; finally, business players strongly opposed to the final outcome 
formed yet another arena within which to decide how best to fight back.  
The decision of whether to create an arena or not is a version of the ‘engagement dilemma’ (Jasper 2006:26). 
All players face choices about whether to enter arenas to make decisions and fight. Choosing to engage entails 
risk, but so does avoiding conflict. Players who create arenas similarly face the engagement dilemma, with the 
added twist that they will bear responsibility not just for their role in the engagement but also for the efficacy 
and reputation of the arena itself. 
Arena creation appears first as a dilemma facing those with the power to do so. If they decide to try, they 
make a variety of tactical choices. As they continue down that path they experience a package of risks, 
opportunities, gains, and losses associated with their (symbolic or literal) ownership of that arena. 
In 2014, Seattle became the first major U.S. city to pass a $15 minimum wage. Arena creation is 
fundamental to the story. After a methodological discussion, we present a narrative of the interactions that led 
to Seattle's historic $15 minimum wage legislation. We pay special attention to the dilemmas associated with 




Most social movement players target and interact with political and business elites. When environmental 
activists shame corporations that pollute or workers ask politicians to regulate the conditions of their 
employment, the targets respond favorably or unfavorably. These players are engaged in strategic interaction. 
We would like full information about all the players, but the motives of activists’ allies and opponents often 
remain obscure. Scholars can more easily study activists’ decisions, motivations, and dilemmas, not least 
because activists are usually more accessible to researchers. Sometimes scholars are movement sympathizers 
or even former members of the groups they study. 
But the corporations, politicians, and other players with whom protestors interact often remain a black box; 
it is hard to observe their strategic decision-making, so it is easy to miss that they too are making strategic 
decisions in their interactions with movement players. Of course, movement players also make backroom 
decisions before entering public arenas that scholars can readily observe. But even those backrooms remain 
more accessible to scholars than corporate boardrooms or the conversations between an elected official and 
her chief of staff, and by the nature of social movements the backroom and the public are more permeable than 
the corporate board room and the public engagements of the corporation’s communications director.   
Interviews are a useful tool for opening the black box, if researchers can access a diverse set of players. 
Selecting a case in a single city—as opposed to a large nation-state—helps, as even the most powerful players 
are potentially accessible. In 2016, Luke Elliott-Negri conducted twenty-one interviews with players from the 
2014 Seattle minimum-wage drama: four elected politicians (Mayor Murray, Councilmember Sawant, then-
Councilmember Licata and now Congressperson Jayapal), two business leaders, one journalist, nine labor 








(though labor-funded) organizations.1 These interviews were conducted just a few years after the strategic 
interactions in question, enabling relatively crisp recollections of events and affects. In addition, we used 
secondary sources to construct the timeline of events that comprised the strategic interactions leading up to the 
passage of the law. 
This breadth of interviews across a range of strategic players enables a more balanced and complex story 
of strategic interaction. While issues of black-box obscurity remain—in our interview with the Seattle Mayor, 
he had staff with him and was circumspect—the players and arenas theoretical framework demands a 
methodological and analytic attention to the strategic interactions that unfolded in Seattle in 2014. We 
interviewed nearly all the players at the center of the fight, from all the key “sides”—elected officials, labor 
negotiators, business owners, and Socialist Alternative leaders.  
We include the media as players. As one labor leader reported in an interview about the role of the media 
in the minimum wage fight: “[H]onestly the fact that it was Lynn Thompson of the Seattle Times covering it 
and not one of their more conservative reporters I think made a significant difference.” And, after the minimum 
wage fight subsided, one of the labor-funded community organizations hired a journalist from a local 
publication that had reported favorably during the most contentious phases of the fight. 
Our methodological choices reflect the players-arenas perspective within which we operate. We do not aim 
to name the general factors that explain a particular outcome, thereby attempting to develop a general 
understanding of the conditions under which movement players can produce such an outcome. Rather, we use 
an agency-centric approach, attempting to capture strategic calculations and interactions in order to show how 
players make decisions in the face of dilemmas and tradeoffs—and that those decisions often, but not always, 
produce patterned packages of gains and losses.  
 
4. Seattle and the Fight for Fifteen 
As Occupy Seattle and encampments around the country faded in early 2012, a small Trotskyist party called 
Socialist Alternative sought to transform movement energy and attention into power in arenas other than public 
parks. They called for 200 Occupiers to run for elective office. Few took up the call, but in Seattle, Kshama 
Sawant ran for state representative, surprising herself and her organization by winning 29 percent of the vote—
a notable proportion of the electorate, although not enough to win office under a winner-take-all electoral 
system. Initially Socialist Alternative had viewed electoral politics primarily as an opportunity to discuss 
socialism explicitly in the public eye. But the surprising showing gave members of the organization a boost of 
confidence – some began to think that they should stop running educational campaigns and instead run to win. 
One Socialist Alternative member, Philip Locker, said, “The pithy answer [to how Socialist Alternative came 
to run a serious campaign for elective office] is luck. The more politically correct answer, which I do believe, 
is that our run in 2012 really confirmed we had an analysis.” A year later, Sawant ran for city council and won 
with 51 percent of the vote, this time making a $15 minimum wage central to her campaign.  
 Meanwhile, in New York City, long-time community organizer Jon Kest pitched the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) on the idea of funding a fast food worker organizing drive. Kest’s New 
York Communities for Change organized around the demand for “$15 and a union.” In the U.S. context, with 
wages stagnant since the 1970s and the federal minimum stuck at $7.25, the demand was audacious. In 2012 
 








and 2013, the group led several brief strikes in New York's fast food industry, and the efforts soon spread 
throughout SEIU’s federated structure, arriving in Seattle in May 2013. Socialist Alternative and SEIU 775, 
one of Seattle’s SEIU locals, were key players in the effort to raise the minimum wage over the course of the 
year between the summer of 2013 and the summer of 2014.  
 The campaigns of Kshama Sawant for City Council and Democrat Ed Murray for Mayor were pivotal 
in elevating the demand for a $15 minimum wage. The Sawant campaign began with three core policy 
proposals, but as fast food worker organizing took off nationally, they largely dropped the other two, focusing 
on the minimum wage. While informants disagreed about the role of Socialist Alternative in the final policy 
outcome, most attributed the city’s initial focus on $15/hour to the Sawant campaign. Following Sawant, Ed 
Murray came out publicly in support of $15, and SEIU 775 endorsed him two days later.  
 On November 5th, 2013, both Sawant and Murray won their races, creating a sense in the business 
community that the $15 threat was real. Howard Wright Jr., owner of Seattle’s iconic Space Needle, said: “[I]f 
it’s coming here then we need to get out in front of it.” His goal was to weaken the legislation as much as 
possible, rather than preventing it altogether. That a key business-side player had a sense of the legislation’s 
inevitability was in large part a result of Sawant and Murray’s victories. 
 
4.1 Arena creation as part of strategic interaction over minimum wage 
Soon after taking office in January 2014, Mayor Murray created a new arena as a means to advance his 
campaign promise—the first of six new arenas created by players in the policy fight (see Table 1, below). In 
order to raise the minimum wage in Seattle to $15 or any other number, the Mayor would need to work with 
the city council and pass legislation. But Murray initially avoided this formal arena of the local polity, 
constructing his own Income Inequality Advisory Committee (IIAC). The group was comprised of 
approximately two dozen individuals representing various segments of the business community, labor unions, 
and community organizations, as well as three members of the city council. Murray knew that the city council 
would ultimately have to pass any bill language that emerged, but he first hoped to build consensus among 
conflicting constituencies, namely business and labor.  
Table 1: Six arenas created in the conflict over minimum wage in Seattle 
New arenas  Player(s) creating the arena Main goal of arena creation 
Income Inequality Advisory 
Committee (IIAC) 
Mayor Murray Find minimum wage compromise 
together with business and labor, 
bypassing the city council 
One Seattle Business players Develop a common strategy for the 
IIAC process and align the interests 
of small and big business 
$15 for Seattle Labor and other sympathetic groups Develop a common strategy for the 
IIAC process and involve those 
players that were left out of the IIAC 
15NOW Socialist Alternative Mobilize publicly (outside the IAAC 
procedure) and against a phase-in 
period 
G8 Mayor Murray Reduce the number of players 
involved and therefore making the 
decision-making more effective than 
in the IIAC  








The IIAC quickly bogged down. Players neutralized one another’s proposals through endless conversation, 
as Murray played a restrained role in meetings. In interviews, players from both camps recounted long and 
generally fruitless gatherings.  
The Mayor’s decision to construct this arena launched the arena-ownership package of gains and losses. 
The IIAC was the Mayor’s arena. Although he initially maintained a light touch, he had the authority and 
resources to shape the rules of the arena, the boundaries of the arena (who was invited in and who was kept 
out), and the processes by which ultimate decisions would be made. If a player has the ability to create a 
genuine arena, this authority is very likely a gain. Yet with this gain comes an increased responsibility for the 
outcomes. In this case, the Mayor wanted to produce a consensus outcome, and the winding, unproductive 
meetings were a setback.2  
To maneuver in the Mayor’s new arena, labor and other sympathetic groups formed “$15 for Seattle,” an 
ad hoc coalition to develop common strategy for the IIAC process that included many players excluded from 
the IIAC itself. Meanwhile the business community formed “One Seattle” for similar reasons. At the start at 
least, the lines of antagonism were clear. 
For all the progressive groups except one, $15 for Seattle was not just a player, but also the most important 
arena aside from the IIAC. Decisions made inside the new group were meant to determine bargaining positions 
in the formal IIAC process, as well as movement strategy and tactics. Socialist Alternative, however, had other 
ideas. In January 2014, Socialist Alternative announced the formation of yet another new player, 15NOW, 
which would build mass support for the legislative goal of $15 and agitate to make it as strong as possible. 
One Socialist Alternative activist said, “For us it was a war, and the question was, how do we build the strongest 
possible army on our side? So that’s what 15NOW was about, was building the strongest possible force on our 
side, in every way, both from making arguments publicly to people on the street making noise.” 15NOW 
ultimately developed chapters across the city that met weekly and hosted monthly meetings that attracted 
hundreds.  
 This gain for Socialist Alternative was simultaneously a loss for the most powerful labor unions in the 
coalition. SEIU, the Central Labor Council, and others lost some control over the movement when Socialist 
Alternative created 15NOW. The name itself hit on a major point of contention, both within the labor coalition 
and between business and labor: if the $15 number seemed inevitable to some, the big question was when? 
From the outset, Socialist Alternative was publicly committed to $15 “now,” meaning a $15 minimum wage 
for all workers in Seattle, the day after the law was passed. Others in the room were willing to agree to a phase-
in period, where the wage would climb gradually to $15. Indeed, a number of informants reported that some 
individuals in the coalition had their own personal agendas, making them less concerned with the details of 
the legislation, so long as it contained the word “15.” 
 The Socialist Alternative path was particularly disconcerting for one coalition partner, the Main Street 
Alliance (MSA), composed of politically progressive small business owners inclined to support pro-worker 
policies such as an increased minimum wage. MSA had been active in constructing and passing the paid sick 
leave law in Seattle a few years before. “But nevertheless, I think it’s fair to say that we [at MSA] were freaked 
out about the notion of 15 now,” reported one organizer. MSA was certainly a labor ally, especially relative to 
 
2 Some players may create false arenas (Jasper 2006:169), where they purposefully hope to produce no outcome at all. The 
same package applies, however: the decision to create an arena creates both increased control and increased responsibility for 









some small business owners on the other side of the table who wanted 15 never. In any case, the “now” position 
that Socialist Alternative took, while creating anxiety on the other side of the table, also created plenty on the 
labor side, highlighting potential disagreements at the $15 for Seattle coalition table. 
In February 2014, both business and labor players were active. Fast food workers staged a one-day, city-
wide boycott of big burger chains, funded mostly by SEIU. Throughout the day, protestors visited all 25 major 
chains, receiving extensive media attention. Such actions were part of SEIU’s broader national fast food worker 
organizing, but they also focused the local Seattle public conversation on the minimum wage. The protests did 
not directly target local business leaders who sat on the other side of the table in the IIAC.  
“Big business” was active within the One Seattle coalition, hiding their resistance to a higher minimum 
wage from the public. According to one informant, the business coalition “hired an African-American 
organizer to go around to all the Black small business owners and tell them it was going to be bad for 
businesses, and they got… some of the Asian businesses fired up.” In February, the Chamber of Commerce 
conducted a poll of businesses, with many reporting that they would be forced to fire workers if there were 
extreme shifts in the minimum wage, a classic business tactic to influence residents and workers of the city. 
With spring on the way, and after many weeks of slow negotiations at IIAC, Socialist Alternative began to 
execute a tactic without the agreement of $15 for Seattle. Importantly, the city charter allows ballot 
amendments and initiatives, unlike in many U.S. cities. The coalition had decided to work the IIAC process 
without threatening to take the fight to the public. But Socialist Alternative disagreed. They filed a charter 
amendment initiative and began collecting signatures. Socialist Alternative stated publicly that they wanted 
the IIAC to work, but that if business-side players would not negotiate with sincerity, they and 15NOW would 
run a massive ballot box campaign for a $15 minimum wage, to be implemented immediately upon its passage.3  
There was finally an open fissure in $15 for Seattle.  
15NOW used their monthly public meetings to create a public process generating the content of the 
amendment. Like Mayor Murray, Socialist Alternative faced the arena-creation dilemma: they wanted to elicit 
broad participation, but also to control the outcome. The split was at once a loss and an opening for SEIU and 
top coalition leaders, generating a radical flank effect. An ally was “out of control,” but labor negotiators in 
the IIAC could now plausibly say to the business interests, in so many words, “You better back down or we 
don’t know if we can control these folks.” Labor players even attended the 15NOW meetings, suggesting to 
business-side players that Socialist Alternative might eventually convince them to support it. 
The lines of antagonism in the IIAC were clear. The main issues the players faced were the length of the 
$15 phase-in period (if any), whether there would be an exemption for tipped workers, and the definition of a 
small business (which would be given a longer phase-in period). With IIAC negotiations dragging on, and 
facing the humiliating paralysis or collapse of his first arena, in March Mayor Murray formed a second arena 
that became known as the G8 – an IIAC subgroup ultimately comprised of three labor leaders and three 
business leaders (two others dropped out).  
Murray again faced the tensions associated with arena creation: he increased his control with the smaller 
arena, chairing meetings more aggressively (participants report his yelling at them on multiple occasions before 
storming out of the room), and the group made some progress. As the mayor himself reported, perhaps 
 
3 We identify the threat of a referendum itself as an effective tactic also in other local conflicts over social policy issues 









reflecting his growing confidence in office, “There seems to be something that people respond to when you’re 
mayor, unlike when you’re the chair of the Ways and Means committee.” He expected that the tighter group 
would make it easier for him to wield the charisma of office. But with increased control over a smaller number 
of players came a corresponding loss: decreased control over the excluded players, both those supportive of 
the legislation and those opposed.  
The unions and business leaders who agreed to sit on the misnamed G8 also experienced various gains and 
losses. Business delay was no longer viable under Murray’s watchful eye, a gain for labor, but Murray also 
wanted to make business happy. The new arena made these players more powerful than those who were left 
out, but less powerful relative to Murray. The opportunity to enter a new arena with a sympathetic but powerful 
“judge” presents a dilemma – the judge may sympathize with you more than with the opposition, but you also 
cede power to the judge. Any player who enters or creates an arena faces a version of the engagement dilemma.  
The G8 worked well for the Mayor where the IIAC had failed. In the smaller room, he was able to use his 
executive authority and the charisma of his position to force the other players to get to their bottom lines. His 
pressure and aggression worked. There were, of course, tradeoffs. One interviewee, who had some power in 
Seattle politics, resented his exclusion from the G8, another example of the arena-ownership package: “I think 
we were cut out of some of those meetings,” this person reported with an edge. The practical and emotional 
effects of exclusion and inclusion may last years, affecting future rounds of conflict and coalition. Murray 
created an arena, giving him the authority to construct boundaries. But those boundaries angered those 
excluded, fueling possible opposition in the future. Yet for the moment, the play appeared to be working, and 
as April unfolded, they grew close to a deal. 
On April 22nd, with the G8 – and hence the IIAC – process on the verge of concluding, the pro-$15 players 
staged a rally, with hundreds surrounding city hall. Although Socialist Alternative had long parted ways with 
the labor coalition, all the players participated in this public event. They expected an agreement to come out 
of the IIAC the next day, and wanted business players to feel some final pressure, to experience viscerally how 
popular an exemption-free minimum wage bill was in Seattle.  
But on April 23rd, hours before the mayor’s planned press conference to announce a deal, the inside 
negotiators hit a serious snag, based on confusion about one of the three core issues separating business and 
labor. Both sides had agreed to a different wage phase-in for small businesses, but the number of employees 
separating large and small business was in dispute. According to union leader David Rolf, we “came into the 
room and said, ‘We think we’ve got a deal, we have an agreement, we’re ready to pop the champagne.’ We 
then went through the exercise of reading aloud what we thought the agreement was, and when I got to 500 
employees nationally they said, ‘No, you said local.’ (quoted in Feit 2014). Under the business-side 
interpretation, megachains like Walmart that might have fewer than 500 employees in Seattle, would be 
eligible for a longer phase-in to the full $15 minimum wage. 
Murray had to face journalists empty-handed. Thompson of the Seattle Times said, “[W]e all show up and 
he’s like, ‘I don’t have an agreement.’ And it seemed devastating at the time. It seemed like, this is a huge 
political disaster. He said, ‘I’m staking my mayor-ship on this.’ … [T]he thing’s falling apart is what it felt 
like.” The increased responsibility associated with arena creation was on full display. If the Mayor had used a 
typical legislative process—that is, if he had entered an existing arena—such a failure would be shared with 
legislators. But having constructed an arena, attribution of failure would land squarely on the Mayor. Over the 








than 500 national employees would not be eligible for a longer phase in period. Mayor Murray announced the 
final plan on May 1st. 
This was the end of the IIAC process, the end of this round of strategic engagement. The G8, an arena 
within an arena, had worked for the Mayor, and so the IIAC ultimately served its function. Labor leaders 
declared victory.  
 
4.2 Strategic interaction without ‘final’ outcomes 
And yet, there is never a clear line demarcating one round of strategic interaction from the next. Though 
participants in the IIAC had agreed to abide by the outcome of the process, some business players had other 
plans. The proposed legislation had to make its way through the city council, and some interviewees reported 
quiet attempts to amend the legislation in that arena. The council, however, was disciplined, and did not change 
course as a result of lobbying.  
In addition to being frustrated with the outcome, some business players were aghast to learn that the 
Socialist Alternative threat of a charter amendment had not been real, due to a procedural misunderstanding 
on the organization’s part. In Seattle, ballot initiatives can be filed every year, but charter amendments only 
every other year, meaning that the business community would have had more than a year to fight the 
amendment, in the court of public opinion and through various procedural means. Some business players felt 
they had been duped.4 A subset of the negotiators broke off to form Forward Seattle. The organization was 
registered to the address of David Minert, a small business owner who had played a minor part in the IIAC 
process. Forward Seattle went so far as to file a ballot initiative to overturn the legislation, although it ultimately 
backed down. 
And in yet another example of the endless nature of strategic engagement, some business leaders 
immediately pivoted to the state legislative arena. The final IIAC package allowed an initial subminimum 
wage exemption for tipped workers in the initial years of the deal, with an eventual sunset. Such exemptions 
are common in the United States, but it was the first of its kind in Washington state. So, business leaders 
immediately attempted to use this provision of city policy to convince state legislators to create a permanent 
exemption in the state statute. Every victory is partial, and strategic interaction does not end even with the 
fullest of victories. To date, business players have not prevailed in changing state statute, but they have not 
entirely given up. 
 
5. Arena Creation and the Resulting Ownership Package  
In a way, the IIAC and the G8 represent a familiar form of arena creation. Often movement players make 
demands on elites, and in response those elites create arenas toward which they channel the movement’s 
energy, as we mentioned earlier with participatory budgeting (Jabola-Carolus et al. 2018). We can see this 
dynamic in a wide range of historical and geographic contexts. The Tzar’s creation of the Duma in response 
to the first Russian Revolution is perhaps a quintessential example. Yet in the case of the Duma—and we 
 
4 Contradicting a central premise of orthodox rational choice theory, this example clearly underlines how resourceful players 
engaged in strategic interaction never have perfect information at their disposal, even in matters of substantial financial 








suspect this is common—the intention was to create an arena that could make few if any decisions, a false 
arena (Jasper 2006:169). Movement players enter the arena, but there are no real decisions to be made, no real 
fights to be had. In such situations, the player who creates the arena attempts to maintain the illusion of 
decision-making power, while preventing the arena from producing concrete outcomes. Certain forms of 
movement institutionalization share this dynamic, often labeled as co-optation or incorporation (Bosi 2016a). 
The IIAC and the G8 are a twist on this classic story. Socialist Alternative and SEIU 775, along with other 
movement players, compelled the Mayor to adopt their position on the minimum wage. Yet once the Mayor 
adopted the position, and ran his campaign on that basis, he actually wanted to produce some version of the 
desired outcome, lest he face re-election a few years down the road having failed to make good on a campaign 
promise. Thus, he created the IIAC not as a false arena, but as a genuine one, within which he could build 
consensus among players who sharply disagreed about whether the minimum wage should be increased and 
by how much. 
Meanwhile, both movement and business players also created true arenas in the context of strategic 
interaction. The broadly “pro-$15” set of organizations created a coalition table at which to decide on a unified 
public position in their negotiations with businesses and the Mayor. From the outside, this group appeared as 
a player, but on the inside, it was an arena rife with conflict. Socialist Alternative ultimately left the arena 
(interviewees hedged on whether this was voluntary or not). They had also created their own arena for 
movement decision-making, which from the outset competed with the coalition arena for status as the central 
movement player. In 15NOW, Socialist Alternative sought to create some collective control over the decision-
making process about their proposed amendment, and yet they also met in advance of public meetings, making 
plans to produce certain outcomes. In this sense, 15NOW verged on a false arena, because the player who 
created it had clear ideas about the decisions it should produce and plans to ensure that it did. Like the Mayor, 
Socialist Alternative experienced the arena-ownership package: they gained increased control, but if they 
wielded that control too heavily, they risked alienating players who might come to see the arena as false.  
Businesses faced many of the same issues as labor in their attempts to form coalitions. Their principal 
player-arena, One Seattle, was also rife with internal conflict, primarily along the lines of small versus large 
businesses. When it struck a deal, some small business players rejected the outcome, and, in violation of the 
founding agreements of both One Seattle and the IIAC, formed yet another decision-making arena in which to 
fight back. Given those agreements, the founders attempted, unsuccessfully, to hide their identities and evade 
responsibility for the arena’s outcomes.  
Each of these arenas had distinct processes and purposes, and in some cases, diametrically opposed goals. 
Yet the players who founded each arena all faced at least one similar dynamic, one recognizable bundle of 
gains and losses that appears to be inherent in the decision to create an arena in the context of sharp strategic 
interaction: the founders increased their control by constructing the arena, but their level of responsibility for 
what the arena produced and how the arena was perceived also increased in a way that risked their reputations, 
their substantive goals in the short-term, and their more long-range goals too. Among the latter was maintaining 
positions of power—which was the Mayor’s concern if he failed to produce what he needed from the IIAC. 
In the heat of battle, one tool that players have at their disposal is to create arenas, something that both 
movements and their targets regularly do. In contemplating such an action, players face a version of the 
engagement dilemma. Few players, even the most powerful, can control their surroundings completely; 
strategic interactions always have contingencies. Once players construct the arena and draw other players into 








in an existing arena. But with that control comes increased responsibility and the risks that responsibility 
entails. Players who construct arenas get to decide who enters or at least the process by which players may 
enter. Excluded players may be angry and lash out in other arenas.  
The reputation of the constructing player is likely to become tied to the arena, both in terms of its substantive 
output and the procedures it adopts. If the arena is or becomes false, other players may shame or isolate the 
founding player as disingenuous. If the player is too powerful to be shamed, other players may simply take 
their marbles and go home, leading to arena collapse. On the other hand, if players construct an arena and 
create rules that are too loose, they may lose control of the arena—and yet still bear responsibility for its form 
and content.  
Like all strategic decisions, constructing arenas involves risk. Here we identify the arena-ownership 
package – we might also dub it the control-responsibility package – that appears to be inherent in the decision 
to build an arena in the context of heated strategic engagement.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The strategic interaction perspective begins to help resolve or reframe some antinomies endemic to social 
movement studies.  
Instead of “movements” we discuss players, and thereby avoid typological debates over what a movement 
is and is not. Whatever else a movement is, it is an aggregation of players, some quite formal and others less 
so. Talking about the players avoids misrepresenting social movements as homogeneous.  
In place of structures, we discuss arenas, the concrete places where structures impinge on action. Again, 
this language and the precise methodological description it implies avoids many of the confusions analysts 
face when discussing “structures” as broad social forces that are many steps removed from actual movement 
players. Arenas force us to specify concretely the constraints that players face in their engagements.  
Instead of success and failure, we discuss gains and losses. There is an ontological dimension to this 
analytical pivot. Success and failure suggest that movements win or lose and then disappear. In fact, the players 
within movements often carry on for decades, the individuals and the organizations especially, but also the 
informal groupings and networks. Sometimes they cohere into something that looks like “a movement,” 
turning people who were once public observers into players themselves. But when that amalgamation of 
players separates, the players go on, engaged in various other forms of strategic interaction. 
Even the biggest movement successes are typically temporary—contingent gains, rather than final 
achievements. Some laws go unenforced, or are overturned a year or a decade later. The opposition never stops 
opposing, and if players move on to other arenas, their gains erode. The language of gains and losses works 
well in the strategic interaction perspective, because it implies no final outcomes, just long sequences of 
various engagements.  
In this paper, we build on the strategic interaction perspective, highlighting the understudied phenomenon 
of arena creation. It begins as a dilemma: whether or not to create an arena; it is then an action or strategy; and 








We suspect that this strategic maneuver, in which a player constructs a new arena from whole cloth, is more 
common than social movement studies suggests. In the case we have analyzed, there were fully six instances 
of arena creation—players constructed new arenas within which to make fraught decisions in the context of 
heated strategic interaction. In fact, we did not set out to look for arena creation, which is to say that we did 
not select this case to fit the theory. Rather, the theory emerged from the data, and the more we looked, the 
more instances we found.  
We urge future researchers, especially those attuned to the micro- and meso-levels of social movement 
studies, to comb their cases for arena creation. It is virtually impossible to tell the story of the policy outcome 
in Seattle, 2014, without this analytic tool. We imagine that it is impossible to understand most other activists’ 
struggles without analyzing a fundamental tool deployed by movement, business, and political players: the 
creation of new arenas. 
This is just one example of the kind of tradeoffs and dilemmas that structure packages of gains and losses 
(Jasper et al. 2022). Movement players have a variety of impacts on arenas, on themselves, on other players, 
on laws and regulations, on understandings and feelings. We need to understand the complex patterns of gains 
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